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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the determinants of short-term wage dynamics, using a
sample of large Hungarian companies for the period of 1996-1999. We test the
basic implications of an efficient contract model of bargaining between the
incumbent employees and the managers, which we are unable to reject. In
particular, there are structural differences between the ownership sectors
consistent with our prior knowledge on relative bargaining strength and
unionisation measures. Stronger bargaining position of workers leads to higher
ability to pay elasticity of wages, and lower outside option elasticity. Our
results indicate that while bargaining position of workers in domestic
privatised firms may be weaker than in the state sector, the more robust
difference relate to state sector workers versus the privatised firms with the
majority foreign ownership.
We examine several extensions. We augment the bargaining specification by
controls related to workers’ skills and find that the basic findings are robust to
that. We take a closer look at the outside options of the workers. We find some
interactive effects, where unemployment modify the impact of availability of
rents on wages. We interpret our results as an indication that bargaining power
of workers may be affected by changes in their outside options. We also
experiment with one concise indicator of reservation wage which is closest to
the theoretical model specification and combines sectoral wages,
unemployment benefits and regional unemployment levels,. We found that
measure performing well.
Finally, we found that while responsiveness of wages towards ability to pay is
higher in the state sector, variation in wage dynamics is lower. This may
indicate some wage smoothing in the state sector, consistent with the
preferences of employees.
Keywords: wages, bargaining, unemployment, privatisation, foreign ownership,
Hungary
JEL Classification: D21, J30, L32, P31
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3Introduction
Wage inflexibility and rent sharing are potentially important explanations of
why employment levels fail to recover in post-communist economies, and why
unemployment rates stabilised at double-digit levels in many of them. Wage rigidity
may have also contributed to the survival of regional inequalities paramount by
western standards.  
However, researcher’s knowledge of how wages are actually set in these
countries is rather poor. The characterisations of the institutional setup as ‘centralised’
versus ‘decentralised’ or ‘coordinated’ versus ‘uncoordinated’ are inevitably arbitrary
since it is difficult to assess the practical importance of the existing institutions. In the
country under examination, for instance, Labour Force Survey data from 2001
suggested that 22% of the employees were union members, 24% earned a wage
influenced by collective agreements, 41% was employed at unionised firm, over 95%
worked in a two-digit industry where at least one firm (potential wage leader)
concluded collective wage agreement, and 100% was subject to minimum wage
regulation and addressee of a national tripartite agreement on the ‘desirable’ rate of
wage growth. Which of these figures bear relevance for wage determination is an open
empirical question that can be best understood by studying actual wage evolutions on
the micro level.1
In this paper we analyse a panel of Hungarian firms applying a bargaining
framework where wages respond to changes in both ability to pay, outside options
and, potentially, bargaining power. We take sales per employee as a proxy of ability to
pay. The influence of regional and industrial factors are observed through the
responses of wages to worker’s outside options. Bargaining power is related to the
distinction between firms with majority ownership of the state, private domestic
owners and foreign owners.
The main contribution of our paper is the following. First, we test the
implications of the bargaining framework controlling for skills and experience
characteristics, and demonstrate that the basic implications are robust to the
augmentation. Second, the results shed some light on the implications of the
                                                          
1 Authors’ calculations using the 2001 April-June wave of the LFS. It might worth mentioning that the
data are themselves of questionable precision. Union coverage in the mid-1990s was estimated to be in
4privatisation process for rent sharing. In particular, privatisation to foreign strategic
investors induce a stronger attenuating effect on rent sharing than privatisation to
domestic owners. Third, while rent sharing is more pronounced in the state sector, we
also find indication of some wage smoothing there. Forth, we use a measure of
regional unemployment, which takes into account that firm’ employment may be split
between several regions. Arguably, the measure applied has lower measurement error
an that is why we are able to detect a strong wage-curve type effect. Fifth, we discover
that regional unemployment  may also modify the ability to pay elasticity of wages,
that is the inside and outside variables interact.
Section 2 motivates the basic model of wage bargaining we refer to. Next, in
section 3 we discuss proxies and indicators for variables. Section 4 describes data.
Subsequently we focus on interference, presenting our specifications and results in
section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. Model of wage bargaining
We start with a brief presentation of a theoretical model that may motivate the
intuition of the empirical specification we wish to test. The two main categories of
bargaining models relate to (i) ‘right to manage’ and (ii) ‘efficient contract’
frameworks.2 The difference relates to the fact that in the latter case the bargaining
process may include employment while in the first case, the managers determine
employment unilaterally after wage decisions are taken. Therefore, in the first case,
the resulting wage and employment combination is always placed on the labour
demand (marginal revenue product of labour) curve. In the second case, they may be
off labour demand curve, as simultaneous bargaining over two variables extends the
possible range of solutions.
However, the empirical difference between the predictions of the ‘right to
manage’ and ‘efficient contract’ models do not relate to interference on wage levels,
but rather on employment. Many models in the “efficient contract” category assume
high weight attached to employment in the objective function of the risk-averse
                                                                                                                                                                     
the range of 20-30% on the basis of firm and worker surveys (Neumann 1997) while some often-quoted
sources like ILO (1997) and OECD (1999) suggested 60% level, see Cazes and Nesporova (2003).
2 One may also notice that the insider control model can be interpreted as a special case of the efficient
contract model.
5employees and therefore predict contract curves, on which employment levels are
higher than those resulting from the competitive equilibrium. In contrast, in the ‘right
to manage’ situation, the bargaining solution is always to the left of the maximum
profit (competitive) solution, while still on the marginal revenue product curve.
Therefore in the latter case the employment is lower.
As we do wish to focus on wages without making predictions about the
employment outcomes, the model of ‘efficient contract’ with risk neutral incumbent
workers bargaining with managers of the firm appeals to us. This is also motivated by
the patterns of unionisation in the country under examination. Union density is
relatively low with 8.2 per cent of the workers being union member in small firms
(less than 50 workers) and 23.8 per cent in large firms. Even in unionised large firms
members account for only half of the employees.3 Practices characteristic of unions
that maximise the welfare of a fixed membership, such as restrictions put on hiring
workers other than those previously laid off from the firm, are largely missing.
Hungarian unions apparently seem uninterested in several issues relevant for
employment-aware bargaining such as import policies, customs duties, or immigration
legislation. Given these features, the assumption of bargaining between the firm and a
small group of insiders (Carruth and Oswald 1985) seems to fit better than the
presumption of employment-aware unions (McDonald and Solow 1982).
In view of this, we adopt the model, in which the contract curve is vertical,
thus employment remains equivalent to the competitive solution. The empirical appeal
of such a model results from the fact, that – unlike models assuming solutions along
the demand for labour curve – the increase in bargaining position of the incumbent
workers leads to higher wages, but does not affect the employment level negatively.
The highest attainable wage corresponds to zero profits. Lowest wage is equivalent to
alternative wage and corresponds to the profits, which would result from the (short
term) competitive equilibrium. The bargaining is depicted by Figure 1 below. 
(Figure 1)
Following Svejnar (1986) we write the generalised Nash bargaining as:
                                                          
3 Hungarian Labour Force Survey April-June 2002.
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where:
w is total wage (labour cost) derived  by the worker from his/her employment,
wa corresponds to the alternative wage, 
L  represents incumbent employment, 
L relates to employment secured as a result of the (implicit) bargain,
δ is a measure of risk aversion (with higher value implying more risk loving),
π represents profits,
R is total revenue,
H relates to non-labour costs of production, and
γ represents the bargaining power of the incumbent workers, where 0≤ γ ≤1.
Assuming risk neutrality (δ =1), the contract curve corresponding to this problem on
the employment-wage plane is vertical, that is employment level is equivalent to the
profit maximising (competitive) equilibrium (L=L*) while wages exceed the
opportunity cost level in proportion to the incumbent workers bargaining power. The
solution reduces to the following condition:
( ) 





−+−=+=
**
1
*
*
L
H
L
Rw
L
ww aa γγ
πγ (2)
where π* represents non-zero profits evaluated at the (short term) competitive
solution.
Thus, we can immediately derive the following implications from the model:
/i/ higher bargaining strength is associated with higher responsiveness of
wages to the firm’s ability to pay and lower responsiveness to outside options; 
/ii/ increase in the reservation wage of the employees will lead to the increase
in wages ( 0
**
1* >−+−=
∂
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a
γ ), as long as the firm produces positive value
added; 
/iii/ with stable employment, positive external shocks to profits (positive to
revenues, negative to non-wage costs) will lead to the increase in wages, as long as the
workers have some bargaining strength ( 0
*
≥=
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7We will focus on those three implications in the empirical section, yet without
attempting to estimate the exact structural form.4
3. Proxies
3.1. Ability to pay
As discussed, following equation (2), we expect wages to respond positively to
alternative wages, profits and bargaining power of incumbent workers. Yet the issue
of empirical proxies is not trivial.
A number of studies use profits per employee as a proxy for quasi rent
(Fakhfakh and Fitzroy 2002, Hildreth and Oswald 1997). Yet, there are problems
since profits are clearly endogeneus.5 In particular, in line with the bargaining model,
wage is a function of profit estimated at the competitive equilibrum solution (π*), not
of realised profit after wage cost is paid (π). As value added is distributed between
profit and wages, that may lead to negative correlation and create an attenuation bias
when profit is taken as determinant of wages with assumed positive sign. The problem
could be alleviated by use of instruments, and this is the approach followed by the
authors quoted above, but that brings in different estimation problems – as always,
reliable exogeneous variables which may affect profits on individual firm level are
difficult to find.6 Third, profits are volatile – they vary significantly from one year to
another. The current ability to pay is in practice determined by retained earnings
accumulated over several years. The above authors were able to use data sets, which
span over long time dimension and could control for several lagged values of profits.
Such dataset are rarely available for transition countries.
For that reason, revenue per employee may be used as a proxy for ability to
pay, which is still consistent with equation (2). This variable was utilised in seminal
paper by Nickell and Wadhwani (1990) and applied in the transition economies
context by Grosfeld and Nivet (1999), Basu et al. (2000), Christev and Fitzroy (2002)
and Mickiewicz and Bishop (2003). In particular, when the specification is augmented
by sectoral wages, the difference between revenue per employee and prevailing sector
                                                          
4 In particular we will follow typical design and approximate the model by log-linear specification.
5 See Van Reenen (1996). 
6 One possibility is to use sectoral level data on profits and demand shocks, provided the relevant data
is available. This is the approach taken by Abowd and Lemieux (1993) and Christofides and Oswald
(1992).
8wage may be treated as a very good indicator of available quasi-rent (Van Reenen
1996). Revenue per head might be also interpreted as labour productivity. Yet, unlike
productivity measures based on some production function specifications, this is a very
imperfect indicator of labour productivity. Even if we label the variable as
“productivity”, it is still a very good indicator of availability of quasi rents, as argued
above. In the context of productivity it is important however to control for the skill
composition of workers. This will be addressed in the empirical section.
3.2.Outside options
The indicators of outside options, which appear often in the estimation of
wage equations, are regional unemployment and outside wages. 
The negative relationship between regional unemployment rates and wages is
often interpreted in terms of the wage curve, which relates to the cross-sectional
relationship between the level of wages and the level of unemployment (Blanchflower
and Oswald 1995). The empirical results confirming microeconomic wage curve are
common in studies of European transition economies, but empirical specifications
differ. We may notice first that the standard interpretation of the basic wage
bargaining model implies regressing change in wages against change in
unemployment, if the second is taken as an indicator of outside options (typically in
natural logarithms). This amounts to first-differencing from wage curve, thus the
derived specifications are parallel. Thus, bargaining model is one possible way to
provide theoretical justification for the wage curve.
However, the research on the cross-sectional link between unemployment and
wages is driven by empirics and specifications differ. In particular, Blanchflower
(1990) found that four alternative measures of unemployment and employment –
some in levels, and some in first differences are negatively and significantly related to
annual earnings. Grosfeld and Nivet (1999) regress first difference of wages against –
alternatively – both the level of regional unemployment and the first difference in
regional unemployment (for Poland), while Mickiewicz and Bishop (2003) use the
latter specification. Duffy and Walsh (2001) and Kertesi and Köllő (1999) (for
Hungary) apply directly the wage curve (both variables in levels), while Christev and
FitxRoy (2002) regress first difference in wages against unemployment level (both
papers for Poland) similar to earlier papers by Christofides and Oswald (1992) (for the
9UK) and Holmund and Zettenberg (1991) (five OECD countries). Holmund and
Zetterberg (1991) also hypothesise that unemployment (they use an economy wide
unemployment rate) is likely to slow down wage growth,7 in their study of the
determinants of industry wages in five countries. Yet, their results show that the
effects of aggregate unemployment vary across countries: negative as expected for
Sweden, Finland and Germany, yet positive for Norway and the USA. The result is
interesting as it possibly reflects differences in institutional labour market
characteristics implying that wage curve may be specific to the labour market
institutions. In particular, the positive coefficient for the USA may imply a more
competitive labour market, which can be interpreted along the lines of the ‘first
generation’ models, where wages may compensate for higher unemployment risk.
Following this line of argument, one may notice that evolving institutional
frameworks in transition countries make testing wage curves for transitional
economies a non-trivial task.
One should also note that the link between wages and unemployment can be
interpreted not only in terms of bargaining theory but also in terms of efficiency wage
theory, where wages do not result from bargaining process but from optimising
decisions by the firms (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).
In addition, as just mentioned, there is a dissenting tradition of the neo-
classical or “first generation” of papers by researchers such as Harris- Todaro (1970),
Hall (1970) and Rosen (1986) predicting that unemployment and wages would move
in the same direction. This relies on the perfectly competitive theory and
compensating differentials. Wages may have to compensate for job characteristics,
location, flexibility, risk to health etc. Duffy and Walsh (2001) provide a brief survey
of the “first generation of papers” written in the 1970’s and 1980’s, which all found a
positive relationship between wages and unemployment. However, they criticise this
line of research for failing to control for regional fixed effects. They argue that after
including regional dummies, the relationship between regional pay and unemployment
are in fact negatively correlated (Ibid., p.25). The evidence is still not conclusive. A
recent study by Cahuc et al. (2002) on a panel of French firms finds some new
evidence that confirms the predictions of equalising differences, as unions accept
                                                          
7 However, they note that the depressing effect of higher unemployment is likely to be bigger in an
aggregate wage equation.
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lower aggregate wages when workers benefit from lower unemployment risk. As
argued above, the parameters of the wage curve are conditional on labour market
institutions (competitiveness in particular), and may be therefore neither cross-country
nor time invariant, thus still worth further testing.
Less controversy relates to the use of alternative wage as an indicator of
outside options. One may notice that the latter link should be more relevant, if the
likelihood of re-entering employment for those workers, who may loose their job is
high. Thus, outside wages and regional unemployment may interact in their effect on
wage dynamics. High unemployment/vacancy ratio, low turnover in the job market
and low outflow into jobs from unemployment, would diminish the importance of
alternative wages, and the level of employment benefits would count more. For
studies based on one country, unemployment benefits are typically uniform. But the
likelihood of entering a new job may be negatively correlated with regional
unemployment. If so, one would expect the latter to be significant component of
outside opportunities.
3.3. Bargaining strength
Finally, we consider proxies of bargaining strength. In line with the empirical
papers exemplified above (in particular: Grosefeld and Nivet (1999), Christev and
FitzRoy (2002) and Mickiewicz and Bishop (2003)), we link bargaining to ownership
characteristics. In particular we hypothesise the stronger position of incumbent
workers in the state sector versus the private sector. This intuition is supported by
results of earlier research on Hungarian labour market by one of the authors. The
results are based on data from the 1998 Wage Survey augmented with data on
collective agreements. In that year the probability that a worker was covered by a
collective wage agreement was lower by 8.2% in case of mixed ownership, 18% in
case of private domestic owners, and 34.5% in case of foreign ownership compared to
state-owned firms, after controlling for firm size. (based on logit model, with firms in
the budgetary public sector excluded, marginal effects, N=103,561, pseudo
r2=0.356).8 This allows direct interpretation based on institutional characteristics of
bargaining (not necessary explicit). Interestingly, it is supported by another dimension,
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which is directly linked to outside options. This second piece of information comes
from the single data set on severance pay – 1994, workers losing jobs and becoming
unemployment insurance recipients in April 1994. The probability that a state sector
worker received severance pay after controlling for tenure and a manual/non-manual
dummy was 11% higher in fully state-owned firms and 16% higher in partly state-
owned firms compared to private firms including foreign ones (logit, marginal effects,
N=5075, pseudo r2=0.2).
4. Data
4.1 Data description
As argued by Hamermesh (1993) firm level data may be superior to household
data for studying the firm-specific issues such as rent sharing. Our sample of large
firms is drawn from the National Labour Centre’s Wage Survey (WS), which is a
matched employer-employee database. The surveys were carried out in May 1986 and
1989 and have been conducted each May since 1992. It contains data of about 150,000
workers employed in 6,000 to 12,000 firms, depending on year. 
The sampling procedure is two-step. At the first step firms are selected, while
at the second, a random sample of full-time employees is drawn within each firm. The
table below summarises the variations in the sampling procedures by sector and firm
size.
Table 1. Sampling procedures for the National Labour Centre Wage Survey
Category Selection of
firms
Selection of
employees
Notes
Budget institutions 100% 100% Armed forces excluded
Firm > 20 employees 100% about 10% 1986-
Firms with 11-20 employees about 12% 100% 1995-
Firms 5-10 employees about 12% 100% 1999-
The sub-sample for this panel was drawn by selecting firms, which reported at
least 30 individual observations (representing roughly 300 employees) in all years
between 1996 and 1999. The firm-level data on the level of employment and nominal
                                                                                                                                                                     
8 Turnover statistics broken down by ownership are not available.
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variables were taken from the firms’ Financial Reports delivered to the tax authorities.
All data refer to annual flows or annual average stocks. The PPI indexes were drawn
from National Accounts on the 4, 3, 2 or 1 digit level whichever was available (32
distinct values). The unemployment rate attached to the firm is the weighted mean of
the micro-region-level unemployment rates given the location of the firm’s branches.
The ownership variable is based on shares in equity as reported in the Financial
Reports. The industry-level variables are calculated using the data of all firms
observed in the WS. Since the firm-level response rate is close to 100 per cent in the
size category considered in this paper we did not use weights to correct for occasional
non-response.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 below presents a description of all available variables.
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Table 2. Description of variables
l_rwage: logarithm of real wage (deflated using a corresponding sectoral ppi)
ebt_rev:  earnings before taxes (but net of financial costs) divided by sale revenue
rtrev: real total revenue from sales
rtremp: real total revenue from sales per employee
rswage: real sectoral wage
unsu_n: ILO-methodology survey based regional unemployment (constructed as a
weighted average of unemployment rates is case of few places of operation)
reswage: reservation wage, constructed as described in section 5.1 below,
Experience and education:
exp_old_young = No of old educated / No of young educated,
ed_low_high = No of low educated / No of high educated
exp_old_tot = No of old educated / (No of old educated + young educated))
lowedu = No of low educated / (No of low educated + high educated),
where ‘old’ means age above population mean, and ‘young’ below mean, and ‘high
education’ stands for secondary and higher education.
Dummies:
small = lowest one third of firms ranked by employment at the beginning of the
period,
large= highest one  third of firms ranked by employment at the beginning of the
period,
state = majority state ownership,
mixed = state, private and foreign shares are all<50 per cent
dom_maj = majority private domestic ownership,
for_maj =  majority foreign ownership,
year97, year98, year 99 = annual dummies,
Sectoral controls constructed as a set of orthogonal contrasts between:
serv_ind = services versus industry,
trade_ser = trade versus other services,
minh_ind = mining & heavy industry versus other industry,
util_ind = utilities versus other industry,
cons_ind = construction versus other industry,
eng_man = engineering versus other manufacturing,
chem_man = chemical industry versus other manufacturing.
Note: The following prefixes will be used: d_ denotes annual change, l_  denotes logarithm,
dl_  denotes logarithmic difference, dp_ relates to percentage change (applied where
logarithms cannot be directly applied due to variables with some negative values, like profit)
Median values for selected variables and for basic ownership and sectoral
cross-sections of firms in the data set are presented in Table 3 below. Reported
significance levels relate to non-parametric tests on the equality of medians.
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Table 3. Median values for selected variables over 1996-1999
Category log change
in real
wage
dl_rwage
earnings
before
taxes/sales
ebt_rev
change in
(EBT /
sales) 
d_ebt_rev
log change
in real
sales
dl_rtrev
log change
in (real
sale/empl)
dl_rtremp
% change
in (low ed/
total)
dp_lowedu
% change
in (old ed/
total edu)
dp_exp_old
All firms .060 
(1279)
.134 
(1796)
.001 
(1279)
.036 
(1279)
.055 
(1279)
-.011
(1033)
-.000
(1035)
State majority
ownership
.049 
(306)
.216*** 
(452)
.002 
(306)
.020** 
(306)
.037** 
(306)
-.009
(269)
.006
(269)
Mixed .010**
(38)
.126
(63)
-.002
(38)
.029
(38)
.055
(38)
-.026
(34)
.035
(34)
Private majority
ownership
.062 
(508)
.135
(687)
.002 
(508)
.016* 
(508)
.060 
(508)
-.005*
(392)
.001
(392)
Foreign majority
ownership
.070† 
(427)
.095*** 
(594)
.000* 
(427)
.086***
(427)
.076† 
(.427)
-.026**
(338)
-.023†
(340)
Industry .057 
(946)
.128***
(1327)
.001
(946)
.024***
(946)
.047
(946)
-.013
(759)
.000
(759)
Services .067
(329)
.164***
(463)
.000
(329)
.073***
(329)
.070
(329)
-.003
(270)
-.007
(274)
Notes:
(i) Number of observations in each category is given in brackets. The growth rates of the
variables were trimmed so that outlier observations in the tails of each variable were removed
(0.5% on both ends, i.e. 1% in case of each variable). That relates to all subsequent
estimations. Results on data with outliers (N=1323 in case of first differences, as compared
with N=1279 here) are available on request. 
(ii) *** Significant at .001; ** Significant at .01; **** Significant at .05; † Significant at .1
(iii) Significance levels relate to Pearson χ2 (continuity corrected) based on the non-
parametric test on the equality of medians. Fisher’s exact test (two-sided) produces very
similar significance results (not reported).
Several conclusions follow immediately from Table 2. Wage growth seems to
be very similar across the ownership and sectoral cross-sections, apart from mixed
ownership, where it is lower, but this category contain a very small number of
observations. More importantly, the wages are growing faster in the foreign sector as
compared with the rest of the sample. The result can be linked to better performance
of foreign firms in terms of growth of both sale revenues and sales per employee (but
not in terms of profits). Interestingly, the foreign controlled companies are also
changing the skill composition of their workforce reducing the share of low-educated
workers; the effect is highly significant as compared with other ownership sectors.
Obviously this is an important complementary explanation of stronger wage growth,
which should be controlled for in multivariate settings.
State firms are characterised by significantly higher profitability, but on the
other hand, the performance of state sector is worse if measured by both the growth of
15
sales and the dynamics of the sales per employee, albeit the last difference is not
significant. The combination of those two characteristics may suggest some static
rents resulting from market power.
Also, the comparison between the industry and service sector is showing no
differences in wage increase, but clear differences in performance indicators. The
service sector is performing better in terms of both profitability and dynamics of
revenues (but the difference in the dynamics of revenue per head is not significant).
The underlying tertiarisation process and the initial underdevelopment of services
inherited from the command economy period may suggest higher growth
opportunities in the latter period.
Last but not least, we looked into the distribution pattern of the key variables.
The most interesting case relates to the pattern of wage dynamics, once it is split
between the state and the private sector. Namely, standard deviation of wage dynamics
is far lower in the state sector than in the private sector. The corresponding histograms
are presented as Figure 5 below. We will return to this result later.
(Figure 2)
5. Interference
5.1 Methods and specifications
The panel we have at our disposal has a very short time dimension. That
renders any attempt at dynamic specification difficult to justify. For that reason our
estimation strategy relies on transforming all variables into natural logarithms and
applying ‘within’ panel estimation (fixed effects model). The model seems to have
most natural interpretation in terms of the comparative statics of equation (2), which
were discussed above. In addition, the Hausman test rejected a potentially more
efficient GLS random effects estimator as inconsistent (for specification (1) in Table 4
below, the test renders χ2(6)=189.18, which is highly significant). A possible criticism
of the use of the fixed effects estimator for wage equations based on regional data is
that it does not take into account the potential endogeneity of unemployment. While
the issue has been raised in the literature, Bell et al. (2000) argue that the problem is
16
unlikely to be serious due to “the high degree of persistence in labour demand and the
notoriously sluggish response of unemployment to shocks of any kind” (Ibid. p.9).
Moreover, in case of estimation based on individual company level wages, where
regional unemployment is included on the right hand size, the problem is alleviated
even further, even if we allow for some impact of large companies on regional labour
markets.
Following earlier discussion, in the benchmark specification we regress wages
on revenue per employee, sectoral wages and regional unemployment (all controlling
for time effects and individual fixed effects). Subsequently, we attempt to see if the
model is robust to alternative specifications.
First, we modify the proxies for alternative options, combining unemployment
and outside wages in one indicator of reservation wage:
Wr = (1-U)*Ws + Ub,
where b relates to replacement ratio, Ws is sectoral wage, and U is the local
unemployment rate.9 Finally, we introduce interactive effects of unemployment with
the ability to pay measure (revenue per employee).
The next set of tests relates to interactive effects based on ownership sectors.
We look at the differences to see if they are consistent with our prior expectations
related to bargaining strength.
Finally, we apply tree quantile regressions, for medians, first and third quartile
of wage growth. While the fixed effect model coefficients may be interpreted as short-
term effects around the individual means, the median regression offer an additional
test of robustness of our results. Here, to account for individual effects, we first
difference all the variables. In addition, the two quartile regressions offer an
opportunity to test directly if the characteristics of response differ along the
distribution of the dependent variable. That is interesting to investigate, given the fact
that the distribution of wage dynamics variable in the state sector is more compressed
than in the private sector (see Figure 2 in the descriptive section above). More
specifically, we are able to test if estimated coefficients of explanatory variables for
wage dynamics are different for firms characterised by high wage growth from those
                                                          
9 In time of our work of this paper we became familiar with Dobbelaere (2004) who applied similar
approach independently (her sample being drawn from Bulgaria 1997-1998).
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for firms with low or negative wage growth and if the ownership differences matter in
this context.
5.2 Results
All estimation results are presented in Tables 4-6.
Table 4. Fixed effects (within) models. Dependent variable: natural logarithm of
real wage (l_rwage). Benchmark specifications: (1)-(3); controlling for education
and experience: (4)-(5).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln (real sales/employment)
(l_rtremp)
.217***
(.013)
.220***
(.013)
.276***
(.048)
.205***
(.013)
.204***
(.013)
ln real sectoral wage
(l_rswage)
.148***
(.020)
- .149***
(.020)
.147***
(.020)
.144***
(.020)
ln regional unemployment
(l_unsu_n)
-.120***
(.033)
- -.156***
(.044)
-.136***
(.036)
-.134***
(.036)
“reservation wage” construct
(l_reswage)
- .151***
(.020)
- - -
ln (unemployment times sales/employment)
(lrem_x_lun)
- - .021
(.017)
- -
ratio of low educated to high educated workers
(ed_low_high)
- - - -.002
(.002)
-
ratio of experienced high educated to
unexperienced  high educated workers
(exp_old_young)
- - - -.002
(.002)
-
share of low educated in total no of workers
(lowedu)
- - - - -.001†
(001)
share of experienced in total no of workers
(exp_old_tot)
- - - - -.044
(.040)
year97 -.002
(.007)
.001
(.007)
-.002
(.007)
-.009
(.007)
-.010
(.007)
year98 -.021
(.010)
.007
(.008)
-.013
(.010)
-.020
(.011)
-.019
(.011)
year99 .072***
(.011)
.090***
(010)
.071***
(.011)
.062***
(.012)
.061***
(.012)
constant -.647***
(.085)
-.335***
(.020)
.746***
(.115)
-.652***
(.093)
-.566***
(.101)
Null: all individual firm effects = zero
(F statistics for joint significance) 24.14*** 25.90*** 24.11*** 22.93*** 19.11***
R2 .49 .49 .49 .50 .50
No of firms 492 492 492 492 492
No of observations 1796 1796 1796 1608 1611
Notes: 
(i) Standard errors in parentheses.
(ii) *** Significant at .001; ** Significant at .01; **** Significant at .05; † Significant at .1
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Table 5. Fixed effects (within) models. Dependent variable: dl_rwage.
Interactive ownership effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln (real sales/employment)
(l_rtremp)
.245***
(.019)
.248***
(.019)
.250***
(.019)
.252***
(.019)
ln (real sales/employment) x priv. domestic dummy
(l_rtremp_do)
-.010
(.014)
-.011
(.015)
-.014
(.015)
-.018
(.015)
ln (real sales/employment) x foreign dummy
(l_rtremp_fo)
-.051***
(.016)
-.055***
(.016)
-.057***
(.016)
-.053***
(.016)
ln real sectoral wage
(l_rswage)
.141***
(.020)
.140***
(.020)
.093**
(.035)
.116**
(.037)
ln real sectoral wage x priv. domestic dummy
(l_rswage_do)
.040
(.034)
.017
(.035)
ln real sectoral wage x foreign dummy
(l_rswage_fo)
.068†
(.036)
.041
(.039)
ln regional unemployment
(l_unsu_n)
-.136***
(.036)
-.076
(.046)
-.087†
(.047)
-.093*
(.047)
ln regional unemployment x priv. domestic dummy
(l_unsu_n_do)
-.036
(.030)
-.026
(.031)
-.016
(.032)
ln regional unemployment x foreign dummy
(l_unsu_n_fo)
-.083*
(.039)
-.057
(.041)
-.046
(.042)
share of low educated in total no of workers 
(lowedu)
-.001†
(.001)
-.001†
(.001)
-.001†
(.001)
.000
(.001)
share of low educated x priv. domestic dummy 
(lowedu_do)
-.001†
(.001)
share of low educated x foreign dummy
(lowedu_fo)
-.002†
(.001)
private domestic majority ownership dummy
(dom_maj)
.027
(.025)
-.063
(.081)
-.034
(.085)
.080
.108
foreign majority ownership dummy
(for_maj)
.128***
(.038)
-.078
(.104)
-.018
(.109)
.083
(.122)
year97 -.011
(.007)
-.011
(.007)
-.012
(.007)
-.012
(.007)
year98 -.023*
(.011)
-.020†
(.011)
-.019†
(.011)
-.020†
(.011)
year99 .057***
(.012)
.060***
(012)
.061***
(.012)
.060***
(.012)
constant -.666***
(.102)
-.523***
(.125)
-.553***
(.126)
-.635***
(.133)
Null: all individual firm effects = zero
(F statistics for joint significance) 18.67*** 18.69*** 18.71*** 18.25***
R2 .51 .51 .51 .51
No of firms 492 492 492 492
No of observations 1612 1612 1612 1612
Notes:
(i) Standard errors in parantheses.
(ii) *** Significant at .001; ** Significant at .01; **** Significant at .05;  † Significant at .1
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Table 6. Quantile regressions. Dependent variable: dl_rwage
(1)
q25
(2) 
q50
(3)
q75
(4)
q75-q25
(5)
q50-q25
(6)
q75-q50
dl_rtremp .194***
(.023)
.245***
(.030)
.264***
(.037)
.069†
(.038)
.051*
(.024)
.019*
(.032)
dl_rtremp_st .158**
(.058)
.108*
(.043)
.069
(.064)
-.090
(.064)
-.050
(.041)
-.039
(.045)
dl_rswage .087**
(.027)
.081***
(.023)
.113***
(.021)
.026
(.027)
-.006
(.022)
.032
(.020)
dl_unsu_n -.130**
(.046)
-.040
(.033)
-.026
(.044)
.105*
(.047)
.091
(.037)
.014
(.039)
dlrev_x_dlun .384**
(.139)
.467*
(.184)
.593*
(.232)
.209
(.198)
.083
(.142)
.126
(.126)
small .003
(.007)
.006
(.007)
.013†
(.007)
.010
(.008)
.004
(.006)
.007
(.006)
large .005
(.008)
.006
(.006)
.012
(.007)
.006
(.008)
.001
(.006)
.005
(.006)
state .018*
(.008)
.003
(.006)
-.016†
(.008)
-.034**
(.011)
-.015†
(.008)
-.019*
(.008)
for_maj -.002
(.008)
.004
(.007)
.003
(.009)
.005
(011)
.006
(.007)
-.001
(.007)
year98 .007
(.011)
.010
(.010)
-.007
(.009)
-.014
(.011)
.003
(.010)
-.017
(.011)
year99 .078***
(.010)
.070***
(.008)
.069***
(.011)
-.009
(.012)
-.009
(.008)
-.001
(.009)
serv_ind -.001
(.002)
-.002
(.002)
-.005†
(.003)
-.004
(.003)
-.002
(.002)
-.002
(.003)
trade_ser -.014*
(.006)
-.012*
(.005)
-.000*
(.008)
.013
(.010)
.002
(.006)
.011
(.007)
minh_ind .004
(.004)
.004
(.004)
.002
(.004)
-.002
(.005)
.001
(.003)
-.003
(.004)
util_ind -.004*
(.002)
-.005***
(.001)
-.007***
(.002)
-.003
(.002)
-.001
(.002)
-.002
(.002)
cons_ind -.000
(.003)
.002
(.003)
.003
(.006)
.003
(.005)
.002
(.003)
.001
(.005)
eng_man .012**
(.004)
.007*
(.003)
.005
(.003)
-.007†
(.004)
-.005
(.003)
-.002
(.004)
chem_man .006
(.005)
.001
(.003)
-.000
(.004)
.006
(.005)
-.005
(.004)
-.001
(.004)
constant -.052***
(.009)
.001
(.007)
.060***
(.009)
.122***
(.010)
.054***
(.007)
.058***
(.008)
Pseudo R2 .20 .22 .21 - - -
N of observ. 1275 1275 1275 1275 1275 1275
Notes:
(i) Number of bootstrap replications: 100.
(ii) Bootstrap standard errors in parantheses.
(iii) *** Significant at .001; ** Significant at .01; **** Significant at .05; † Significant at .1
‘Smaller firms’ (column 4) refer to the bottom 1/3 of the sample when ordered by size at the beginning
of the sample period. Correspondingly, ‘larger firms’ (column 5) refer to the top 1/3 of the sample.
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5.3. Discussion
Clearly, wages seem to respond to the measures of ability to pay, i.e. to sales
per employee. The estimates of corresponding aggregate elasticities vary between 0.20
and 0.28 depending on specification (Table 4). They are similar to those found for
Poland by other researchers. Comparing with previous results on Poland, we may see,
that Grosfeld and Nivet (1999) reported sales per employee elasticity of wage at 0.14
for early transition period and Mickiewicz and Bishop (2003) at 0.23. However,
Christov and FitzRoy (2002) fiund higher elasticities for Poland, at 0.60-0.62 for more
recent period.
Turning to alternative wage, we may see that the sectoral wage is consistently
significant (with elasticity estimates in a range of 0.14-0.15), and so is unemployment
(elasticity between –0.12-0.14). Combining both variables into one proxy of
reservation wage lead to estimate of elasticity (0.15), which is in a very similar to
range.
We also investigated if the regional unemployment effect on wages may have a more
composite way. In specification reported in column 3 of Table 4 we introduce an
interactive effect between the unemployment rate and the sales revenue per employee
(lrem_x_lun). The same effect is than reproduced in quantile regressions (Table 6),
this time defined as interaction between logarithmic changes (dlrem_x_dlun). While
the variable is insignificant in the first specification, it remains significant in the
subsequent three. It suggest that in addition to the direct effect of the two variables,
we have a situation, where increase in regional unemployment is associated with
higher sensitivity of wages to ability to pay. For sake of illustration, see Figure 3 with
the estimated effects from column 2 of Table 6 (a range of values for simulations is
taken approximately within one standard deviation each way from the sample means).
The curves depict the estimated change in wages as a function of change in company
revenues, at different rates of change in regional unemployment. When unemployment
is increasing (see the upper curve) changes in ability to pay have stronger effect on
wages. Higher revenues are conducive to higher wages irrespective of whether
unemployment falls or rises but the revenue-specific differentials widen as conditions
on the local labour market are deteriorating. 
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Most of these implications are straightforward to interpret. When revenues do
not change the firm simply takes no action. When revenues rise the workers acquire a
part of the gain in the form of higher wages, and their ability to do so does not
strongly vary with changes in outside opportunities. When revenues fall the firm cuts
wages, particularly when unemployment is on the rise. This, we believe, is consistent
with the assumption of revenue sharing with incumbents who are not highly exposed
to fluctuations in the labour market.
We tested if the results are driven by changes in the firm’s skill composition
using data on the shares of (i) low-educated, (ii) young-educated and (iii) old-educated
workers with ‘high education’ standing for secondary or higher education, and ‘old’
standing for experience longer than the median. Using this data we test two sets of
variables. In Table 4, column 4 we report a specification, where we control for
experience and education, defining the following variables:
dp_exp_old_you = percentage change (old educated / young educated),
dp_ed_low_high = percentage change (low educated / high educated)
and in column 5:
dp_exp_old_tot = percentage change (old educated / (old educated + young educated))
dp_exp_lowedu = percentage change (low educated / low educated + high educated).
The second specification detects an effect of change in skill heterogeneity on wage
dynamics, even if the time period is very short to allow much variation in those
variables, and the measures applied here are crude. 
We do not intend to conclude that skills and experience dimension does not
matter. Interestingly, we also explored interactive effects between ability to pay and
the experience and education variables. It seems that both may have some positive
modifying effect on ability to pay elasticity of wages. Thus, it may be that more
experienced workforce and that with higher level of education has stronger bargaining
position. Nevertheless, the obtained results were insignificant and not robust to
specification. For that reason we leave it for further research.
Last but not least, we hypothesised that the bargaining position of incumbent
workers is likely to be stronger in the state sector. To see if this is confirmed
empirically, we estimated the basic model with two sets of interactive affects: for
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firms with majority domestic private ownership and those with majority foreign
ownership, with the state sector firms taken as a benchmark (mixed with a small
number of firms with mixed ownership). Table 5 presents the corresponding
specifications. There are clear differences between the state sector and both private
domestic and foreign sectors. Looking into details one may see, that the differences
are most clear in case of the elasticity of ability to pay and again in case of the
interactive effect with sectoral wage. Ability to pay elasticity of wages is
insignificantly higher in the state firms as compared with the domestic private firms,
and insignificantly higher as compared with the foreign firms. In the latter group, the
modifying effect of local unemployment is also strongest.
The results are consistent with the theoretical model and our prior knowledge
about the bargaining position of workers, which is the strongest in the state sector,
followed by the domestic private firms and weakest in the foreign firms.
Correspondingly, responsiveness to the ability to pay diminishes and responsiveness
to outside options increases, as predicted.
Quantile regressions (Table 7) reveal another difference with respect to state
sector behaviour. Where the econometric model predicts low (negative) real wage
growth, the wage growth in the state firms is stronger. On the other hand, where the
model predicts high growth, the state firms are characterised by weaker growth
dynamics. The corresponding inter-quantile differences are significant (Table 7,
columns 4-6) and may be taken as an indication that there is some wage smoothing in
the state sector (which may be consistent with the workers preferences playing more
important role there). On the other hand, in this respect the foreign companies are not
different from the private domestic companies.
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Again, In the quantile regressions, we measure differences in bargaining power
of the state sector workers by introducing the interactive effect between the state
sector dummy and ability to pay (dl_rtremp_st).10 But this time we are able to detect if
the effect vary for different positions of firms on wage distributions. We may see that
it is significant and strongest in case of companies with lowest and average wage
growth and weaker and insignificant where wage growth is high. A tentative
conclusion is that the bargaining strenght matters most, where the wage growth is
weak. In case of companies with strongest wage growth, the modifying impact of
bargaining strength is weak.
6. Conclusions
The findings from the panel analysed in the paper seem to support the basic
implications of a bargaining model with incumbent workers. In particular, the wages
are responsive to alternative measures of firm’s ability to pay and there are structural
differences between the ownership sectors consistent with our prior knowledge on
relative bargaining strength and unionisation measures. 
However, we examined several extensions. We augmented the bargaining
specification by controls related to evolution in workers’ skills and find that the basic
implication of the bargaining model are not affected, even if wage dynamics is
influenced by the change in composition of workers skills as approximated by
education. We took a closer look at the outside options of the workers. We found that
while the effect of regional unemployment on wage dynamics is significant, when an
appropriate measure is used. We also found an interactive effect, where
unemployment dynamics modify the impact of availability of rents on wages. In case
of rising unemployment, the effect of ability to pay appears to be amplified. Wages
were most considerably cut in the case of falling revenues and fast-rising
unemployment – a situation where worker’s insistence on the prevailing wage may put
even incumbent jobs at risk.
                                                          
10 Alternatively, we could drop dl_rtremp altogether, replacing it by a set of interactive effects, created
by multiplying dl_rtremp by all ownership sectors dummies. However in that case, we would risk
enforcing the significant results for those new variables. Our specification is more conservative, i.e. it is
a better method of testing if state sector affiliation has modifying effect on elasticity. The coefficient on
dl_rtremp_st may be interpreted as a differential effect of the state sector affiliation on elasticity.
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We found significant link between firm-level and industry-level wage
dynamics but the estimated elasticity of firm wages with respect to sector wages were
fairly low (about 0.14), calling into question if industry wage agreements have strong
impact on firm-level wage determination. We also experimented with one concise
indicator of reservation wage, which combines sectoral wages, unemployment benefits
and regional unemployment levels, which is closest to the theoretical model
specification. We found that measure performing well.
Finally, we found that while responsiveness of wages towards ability to pay is
higher in the state sector, variation in wage dynamics is lower. This may indicate
some wage smoothing in the state sector, consistent with the preferences of
employees.
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Figure 2. Histograms: wage dynamics in the state and private sector.
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Figure 3. The effect of a change in (sales/worker) on the wage at various rates of change in 
local unemployment (simulations based on Table 6, column 2)
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